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Hans Morgenthau’s concept of power is widely debated among scholars of International 
Relations. Superficial accounts present Morgenthau’s concept of power in the Hobbesian 
tradition as a means of self-preservation; however, more thorough investigations 
demonstrate Morgenthau’s psychogenic and praxeological understanding. By referring to 
Sigmund Freud and Max Weber, such accounts identify Morgenthauian power as the ability 
to dominate others. This article contributes to this discourse by demonstrating that 
Morgenthau separated power into two dualistic conceptualisations. Although analytically 
Morgenthau worked with a concept of power understood as domination, normatively – in 
reference to Friedrich Nietzsche and Hannah Arendt – he promoted a concept of power that 
focused on the will and ability to act together. Elaborating this dualistic concept has wider 
implications for current International Relations because it reminds scholars to be self-
reflexive. In addition, it is argued that a Morgenthauian scholarship helps scholars to gain a 
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Power is one of the constitutive characteristics of politics that sets it apart from other social 
realms; in addition, Hans Morgenthau considered it to be one of the ‘perennial problems’2 
of politics which is why he repeatedly turned to questions of power. While the academic 
engagement with Morgenthau was to a certain extent based upon his status as a doyen of 
International Relations3 – a status that required other scholars to distinguish their work 
from Morgenthau’s – it was also the interest in his contribution to this discourse on power 
that fostered the study of his work. Early assessments of Morgenthau’s concept of power 
were largely depreciative, arguing it would be unscientific: a perception that demonstrates 
the different understandings of the purpose of a theory. Whereas Morgenthau was firmly 
rooted within the hermeneutical tradition of Continental European philosophy, his 
commentators often shared a different understanding of a theory. For them, a theory was 
supposed to explain political events by putting them into a teleological framework. 4  
Contrastingly, current assessments provide a more nuanced picture of Morgenthau’s 
concept of power. By carefully analysing Morgenthau’s intellectual relationships with other 
scholars, we know that his concept of power cannot be understood without considering the 
intellectual environment that had shaped his thought during the Weimar Republic. Michael 
Williams, Hans-Karl Pichler, as well as Stephen Turner and George Mazur expounded that 
Morgenthau developed his concept of power in close congruence to Max Weber.5 Indeed, 
                                                          
2 Hans J. Morgenthau, ‘Reflections on the State of Political Science’, Review of Politics, 17:4 (1955), p. 434 and 
Politics in the Twentieth Century. Volume I. The Decline of Democratic Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1962), p. 19. 
3 Stanley Hoffmann, ‘An American Social Science: International Relations’, Daedalus, 106 (1977), p. 44; David 
Fromkin, ‘Remembering Hans Morgenthau’, World Policy Journal, 10:3 (1993), p. 81; and Robert J. Art, ‘Hans J. 
Morgenthau: The Visionary Realist’, in Christian Hacke et.al. (eds), The Heritage, Challenge and Future of 
Realism: in Memoriam Hans J. Morgenthau (1904-1980) (Göttingen: V & R, 2005), p. 77. 
4 For example: Benno Wasserman, ‘The Scientific Pretensions of Professor Morgenthau’s Theory of Power 
Politics’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 13:1 (1959). 
5 Hans-Karl Pichler, ‘The Godfathers of “Truth”: Max Weber and Carl Schmitt in Morgenthau’s Theory of Power 
Politics’, Review of International Studies, 24:2 (1998); Michael C. Williams, The Realist Tradition and the Limits 
of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Stephen P. Turner, ‘Hans J. 
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empirically, Morgenthau agreed with Weber’s tripartite division of power. However, 
Christoph Frei, Ulrik Enemark Petersen, and Mihaela Neacsu demonstrated that 
Morgenthau did not simply rephrase Weber, but his thought was also strongly influenced by 
Friedrich Nietzsche.6 Finally, Robert Schuett asserted that the influence of psychoanalysis on 
Morgenthau should not be underrated, as his concept of power draws on Sigmund Freud, 
too.7  
Despite the important discoveries this discourse has achieved to date, insight into 
Morgenthau’s concept of power remained limited due to their analytical focus on one 
specific intellectual relationship. This limitation even caused interpretational inconsistencies 
by establishing erroneous connections, as happened to Turner and Mazur.8 To avoid this 
problem, the present article proceeds differently. It discusses Morgenthau’s concept of 
power from a conceptual history point of view. It is not interested in intellectual 
relationships per se, but aims to understand Morgenthau’s usage of power through putting 
it into the intellectual context in which Morgenthau developed his thought. To establish this 
context, Morgenthau’s major published and unpublished works, ranging from his earliest 
contributions to Weimar jurisprudence to his latest pieces on politics and ethics, are 
considered.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Morgenthau and the Legacy of Max Weber’, in Duncan Bell (ed), Political Thought and International Relations. 
Variations on a Realist Theme (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); and Stephen Turner and George Mazur, 
‘Morgenthau as a Weberian Methodologist’, European Journal of International Relations, 15:3 (2009). 
6 Ulrik Enemark Petersen, ‘Breathing Nietzsche’s Air: Morgenthau’s Concepts of Power and Human Nature’, 
Alternatives, 24:1 (1999); Christoph Frei, Hans J. Morgenthau. An Intellectual Biography (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 2001); and Mihaela Neacsu, Hans J. Morgenthau’s Theory of International 
Relations. Disenchantment and Re-enchantment (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). 
7  Robert Schuett, ‘Freudian Roots of Political Realism: the Importance of Sigmund Freud to Hans J. 
Morgenthau’s Theory of International Power Politics’, History of the Human Sciences, 20:4 (2007). Schuett 
repeats this argument in his recent monograph: Political Realism, Freud, and Human Nature in International 
Relations. The Resurrection of the Realist Man (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).  
8 Turner and Mazur interpreted Morgenthau’s mentioning of Standortgebundenheit to be referring to Weber. 
However, the concept of Standortgebundenheit was introduced by Karl Mannheim to German sociology. See: 
Turner and Mazur, ‘Morgenthau as a Weberian Methodologist’, pp. 487-8. 
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This analytical focus provides a wider perspective on Morgenthau’s concept of power and it 
can thus be argued that Morgenthau understood power as a psychogenic and inter-
subjective condition of politics. 9 Power cannot be acquired through an endogenous 
accumulation of financial means and/or weaponry, but through the interaction of people. 
Depending on the intention of this interaction, Morgenthau envisaged two dualistic forms of 
power. In his first American monograph, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, he worded it 
figuratively: ‘Man is the victim of political power by necessity; he is a political master by 
aspiration.’ 10  These two forms of power were most meticulously elaborated in 
Morgenthau’s European writings in which he distinguished between Macht and Kraft and 
pouvoir and puissance, respectively.11 It is argued that Morgenthau understood pouvoir as 
the ability to dominate others (as seen in the animus dominandi). For Morgenthau, in times 
of nation-states, this was the prevailing form of power in human interaction, which is why it 
is termed empirical power here, whereas puissance signified the intention to wilfully act 
together to create a life-world in consideration of a common good (normative power).  
In order to disentangle Morgenthau’s dualistic concept of power, this article proceeds in 
three steps. First, since Morgenthau viewed power as a psychogenic condition, 
Morgenthau’s localisation of power in human nature is elaborated by discussing the drives 
that he considered to be the fundamental characteristics of human action. Second, this 
                                                          
9  In an early manuscript Morgenthau called power to be of ‘durchgehende[r] Geistigkeit’ (absolute 
intellectuality). See: Hans J. Morgenthau, ‘Über die Herkunft des Politischen aus dem Wesen des Menschen’, 
1930 (Container 151, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC), p. 43. 
10 Hans J. Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics (London: Latimer House, 1947), p. 153. 
11 Morgenthau, ‘Über die Herkunft des Politischen aus dem Wesen des Menschen’, p. 9; La Notion du 
“Politique” et la Théorie des Différends Internationaux (Paris: Recueil Sirey, 1933); and ‘Über den Sinn der 
Wissenschaft in dieser Zeit und über die Bestimmung des Menschen’, 1934 (Container 151, Manuscript 
Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC), p. 33. There is no evidence why Morgenthau only negligently 
defined his concept of power in his English writings. One explanation might be that the term “power” in 
English entails empirical and normative components as power can be used to describe any human effort to 
achieve a specific end. In German and French, power is more narrowly defined. See: Raymond Geuss, 
Philosophy and Real Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), p. 27. 
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article discusses Morgenthau’s empirical concept of power – pouvoir – and finally the kind 
of power normatively suggested by Morgenthau – puissance – is elaborated in order to 
contrast it from the empirical notion. The concluding remarks provide an outlook on the 
implications Morgenthau’s dualistic concept of power has for contemporary International 
Relations. First, it reminds scholars that understanding world politics not only requires 
considering the context of the research object in question, but this contextualisation also 
needs to be applied to the concepts which are being used in the process of understanding 
world politics. Second, it is argued that a Morgenthauian inspired scholarship helps us to 
gain a more profound understanding of the current depoliticisation in modern democracies.  
 
Power and Human Nature 
In order to demonstrate that Morgenthau pursued a psychological definition of power, we 
have to refer to his earliest European writings. In an unpublished manuscript from 1930, 
Über die Bestimmung des Politischen aus dem Wesen des Menschen (The Derivation of the 
Political from the Nature of Man),12 Morgenthau noted that human action is determined by 
‘the impulse of life striving to keep alive, to prove oneself, and to interact with others.’13 
Hence, for Morgenthau, there are two fundamental drives: the drive for self-preservation 
(Selbsterhaltungstrieb) and the drive to prove oneself (Bewährungstrieb).14 It is this latter 
drive that is central to Morgenthau’s concept of power. 
                                                          
12 This manuscript was Morgenthau’s first attempt to further conceptualise the political; a study which he had 
announced in his doctoral thesis the year before (See: Hans J. Morgenthau, Die internationale Rechtspflege, ihr 
Wesen und ihre Grenzen (Leipzig: Robert Noske, 1929), p. 72). Morgenthau provided a more substantial 
elaboration with La notion du “Politique” in 1933. The English translation of this book was recently published 
and I will refer to this translation throughout the rest of the article: Hans J. Morgenthau, The Concept of the 
Political. Edited by Hartmut Behr and Felix Rösch (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).  
13 Morgenthau, ‘Über die Herkunft des Politischen aus dem Wesen des Menschen’, p. 5 (my translation). 
14 Ibid., p. 15. 
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At the time Morgenthau was writing this manuscript in Frankfurt, he was employed as a 
clerk in Hugo Sinzheimer’s law office. His work with Sinzheimer brought him into close 
intellectual contact with members of the Institute for Social Research, in which the 
discipline of psychoanalysis was well received.15 Library tickets from the Frankfurt University 
suggest that Morgenthau closely studied Freud at that time, too.16 Following Robert Schuett, 
this engagement explains why Morgenthau drew upon Freud’s ego and sexual instinct in his 
elaboration of these two human drives.17 Despite Morgenthau’s later attempt to downplay 
the effect that Freud had on his understanding of human nature, his almost identical 
reasoning demonstrates Morgenthau’s intellectual indebtedness.18 Freud noted that ‘I took 
as my starting-point a saying of ... Schiller that “hunger and love are what moves the 
world”.’19 In Morgenthau’s manuscript we find a similar passage: 
‘If the striving for the preservation of one’s life is caused by a deficiency, he is ... a 
child of hunger. If he is striving to balance or avoid a lack of energy, then this striving 
to prove oneself is caused by a surplus of energy seeking release. This finds … one of 
its most characteristic expressions in love.’20  
Although Morgenthau considered the drive for self-preservation (hunger) to be the more 
fundamental of the two because the preservation of one’s life is the central concern for 
humans, it is of minor importance for a political analysis of Morgenthau’s concept of power. 
                                                          
15 Peter Gay, Freud. A Life of our Time (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1988) and William E. Scheuerman, ‘Realism 
and the Left: the Case of Hans J. Morgenthau’, Review of International Studies, 34:1 (2008).  
16 Container 151, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. 
17 Schuett, ‘Freudian Roots of Political Realism’, p. 59. 
18 Hans J. Morgenthau, ‘Fragment of an Intellectual Autobiography: 1904-1932’, in Kenneth W. Thompson and 
Robert J. Myers (eds), Truth and Tragedy. A Tribute to Hans J. Morgenthau (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 
1984), p. 14. 
19 Sigmund Freud, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. Volume XXI. 
The Future of an Illusion. Civilization and its Discontents and Other Works (London: Hogarth Press, 1961), p. 
117. 
20 Morgenthau, ‘Über die Herkunft des Politischen aus dem Wesen des Menschen’, pp. 5-6 (my translation). 
Similar: Schuett, ‘Freudian Roots of Political Realism’, p. 59. 
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Morgenthau informed his readers that ‘[t]he desire for power ... concerns itself not with the 
individual’s survival, but with his position among his fellows once his survival has been 
secured.’21 Therefore, as mentioned, central to Morgenthau’s concept of power is the drive 
to prove oneself (love)22, and it cannot be understood in the Hobbesian tradition as a means 
of self-preservation for which Morgenthau has become unjustly criticised.23 This criticism 
occurred, even though a more careful contextualisation argued the converse, 24 and 
Morgenthau publicly repudiated this connection to Hobbes. In a letter to the editors of 
International Affairs, Morgenthau criticised Martin Wight for having drawn this analogy.25 
Two aspects of the drive to prove oneself deserve to be further elaborated, as they 
influenced Morgenthau’s conceptualisation of power. 
First, only when the drive to prove oneself affects other people, it becomes political. For 
Morgenthau, the intention of this drive was to make oneself aware of one’s own life and 
thereby establish an awareness of one’s strengths and capabilities. The self manifests itself 
only through the other, which is why this drive finds its expression itself in games, arts, 
science, and even relationships. ‘[E]verywhere where the human being strives to show 
                                                          
21 Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, p. 165. 
22 For a detailed discussion of the relation between love and power, see: Ty Solomon, ‘Human Nature and the 
Limits of the Self: Hans Morgenthau on Love and Power’, International Studies Review 14:2 (2012). 
23 Examples are: Erik Ringmar, Identity, Interest and Action. A Cultural Explanation of Sweden’s Intervention in 
the Thirty Years War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 50 and Erhard Forndran, ‘Grenzen des 
Realismus. Zu Erklärungsversuchen internationaler Beziehungen. Teil II: Zur Reichweite realistischer 
Argumentation‘, Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft, 7:1 (1997). 
24 For example: Robert C. Good, ‘The National Interest and Political Realism: Niebuhr’s “Debate” with 
Morgenthau and Kennan‘, Journal of Politics, 22:4 (1960), p. 612; A. J. H. Murray, ‘The Moral Politics of Hans 
Morgenthau’, Review of Politics, 59:1 (1996), p. 84; Frei, Hans J. Morgenthau, p. 127; Michael C. Williams, 
‘Why Ideas Matter in International Relations: Hans Morgenthau, Classical Realism, and the Moral Construction 
of Power Politics’, International Organization, 58:4 (2004), p. 634; Yutaka Miyashita, ‘From International Law 
to International Morality, or was Hans J. Morgenthau a Realist before the Exile?’, Bulletin of Niigata University 
of International and Information Studies, 12 (2009), pp. 134-5; and Seán Molloy, ‘Hans J. Morgenthau Versus E. 
H. Carr: Conflicting Conceptions of Ethics in Realism’, in Duncan Bell (ed), Political Thought and International 
Relations. Variations on a Realist Theme (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 97-101. 
25 Hans J. Morgenthau, ‘Dilemmas of Politics’, International Affairs, 35:4 (1959), p. 502. 
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“what he can”’26 is the drive to prove oneself its origin. It is entirely directed to gain and 
increase pleasure; in particular, challenging situations promise its highest surplus since they 
require overcoming obstacles by mastering non-routine situations.27 Such situations assure 
one’s identity because they promise the appraisal of others.28 However, only when, in these 
interpersonal relationships, the drive to prove oneself takes an explicit interest in humans, it 
becomes political, as the following quotation from Science: Servant or Master? 
demonstrates: 
‘Thus the scholar seeking knowledge seeks power; so does the poet who endeavours 
to express his thoughts and feelings in words ... They all seek to assert themselves as 
individuals against the world by mastering it. It is only when they choose as their 
object other men that they enter the political sphere.’29  
Second, human existence was for Morgenthau characterised by tragedy, as Richard Ned 
Lebow30 asserts. This tragedy is a result of an excessiveness of the drive to prove oneself; 
the potential gain of pleasure and the objects to which that gain is directed are without 
limit.31 In his doctoral thesis, Morgenthau remarked that all questions are applicable to this 
drive as they ‘are seized at random, irrespective of the actual content.’32 As a result, an 
individual can aspire for satisfaction and pleasure; however, because of the drive’s 
limitlessness, such aspirations will never be achieved. In Morgenthau’s eyes, very few came 
close to achieving the pleasure principle. The love of Don Juan, Icarus’s striving for the sun, 
                                                          
26 Morgenthau, ‘Über die Herkunft des Politischen aus dem Wesen des Menschen’, p. 6 (my translation). 
27 Ibid., pp. 26-7. 
28 Ibid., pp. 31-2. 
29 Hans J. Morgenthau, Science: Servant or Master? (New York: New American Library, 1972), p. 31. 
30 Richard Ned Lebow, The Tragic Vision of Politics. Ethics, Interests, and Orders (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), chapter 6 and ‘Tragedy, Politics and Political Science’, in Richard Ned Lebow and Toni 
Erskine (eds), Tragedy and International Relations (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). Also other scholars 
suggest this aspect; for example: Mark Chou, ‘Morgenthau, the Tragic. On Tragedy and the Transition from 
Scientific Man to Politics Among Nations’, Telos, 157 (2011).  
31 Morgenthau, ‘Über die Herkunft des Politischen aus dem Wesen des Menschen’, p. 70. 
32 Morgenthau, Die internationale Rechtspflege, pp. 126-7 (my translation). 
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and Faust’s thirst for knowledge are such examples. More than a decade earlier, 
Morgenthau also included the imperial aspirations of Alexander the Great and Napoleon 
Bonaparte.33 However, these were exceptions, and all of their aspirations failed. Vanitas is 
the leitmotif in the narratives of Don Juan, Icarus, and Faust, and Alexander and Napoleon 
also paid the price for their attempts to create an empire. Morgenthau elucidated a further 
tragedy in the drive to prove oneself in that its extreme limitlessness gets into conflict with 
the drive for self-preservation. Eventually, this conflict could endanger one’s life and the 
lives of others.34  
Subsequently, locating power in human nature, by characterising it as a constant urge of 
ideational self-realisation within interpersonal relationships, allowed Morgenthau to 
conceive a praxeological conceptualisation of power, in terms of its socio-political utilisation. 
For Morgenthau, as soon as people interact, power is created, and attempts to eradicate it 
are pointless; rather, attention needs to be paid on what kind of power is established. 
Morgenthau argued that power in its empirical form (pouvoir), that is, the ruthless and 
egoistic pursuit of the drive to prove oneself (the animus dominandi), allows for the 
depoliticisation of social life, as politics is reduced to an institutionalised understanding, 
whereas power in its normative form (puissance) establishes the political, as it enables 
people to pursue their interests and work together for a common good. 
 
Pouvoir: Morgenthau’s Empirical Concept of Power 
                                                          
33 Ibid., p. 71; ‘The Evil of Politics and the Ethics of Evil’, Ethics, 56:1 (1945), p. 13; and Scientific Man vs. Power 
Politics, p. 166.  
34 Morgenthau, Die internationale Rechtspflege, pp. 75-7 and Freud, Civilization and its Discontents and Other 
Works, p. 117. 
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Morgenthau argued that in modern democracies, power was predominantly generated in 
the form of the animus dominandi: ‘the desire for power’35 and the lust for the domination 
of people. As illustrated in Morgenthau’s statement, ‘je constate simplement ce que je 
vois’,36 he had to deal with this concept analytically, since socio-political developments in 
modern societies had reduced power to a tool for domination.  
Modern societies had voided people of their metaphysical foundation. Various unpublished 
manuscripts from the 1930s, in which Morgenthau elaborated on the reasons and effects of 
this dehumanising development, suggest that the dehumanising effects of this void 
concerned Morgenthau greatly.37 But also in later years, Morgenthau expressed his disquiet 
as evidenced in Science: Servant or Master?.  
The exact circumstances of these socio-political developments do not have to interest us 
here, as they have been further elaborated elsewhere.38 For the argument of this article, it 
is merely important to recall that ideologies had gained momentum in the nineteenth 
century with the rise of nationalism, liberalism, conservatism, and socialism, and climaxed in 
the early twentieth century in fascism and communism. Morgenthau paid particular 
attention to nationalism, as its principle of sovereignty provided nation-states with the 
means to enforce homogeneity domestically through the institutionalisation of education, 
                                                          
35 Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, p. 165. 
36 Hans J. Morgenthau, ‘Positivisme mal Compris et Théorie Réaliste du Droit International’, in Silvio A. Zavala 
(ed), Colección de Estudios Históricos, Jurídicos, Pedagógicos y Literarios. Homenaje a D. Rafael Altamira 
(Madrid: C. Bermejo, 1936), p. 5. 
37 Hans J. Morgenthau, ‘Der Selbstmord mit gutem Gewissen. Zur Kritik des Pazifismus und der neuen 
deutschen Kriegsphilosophie’, 1930 (Container 96, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC); 
‘Über den Sinn der Wissenschaft’; and Hans J. Morgenthau, ‘Kann in unserer Zeit eine objektive Moralordnung 
aufgestellt werden? Wenn ja, worauf kann sie gegründet werden? Kennwort: Metaphysik’, 1937 (Container 
112, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC). 
38 Felix Rösch, ‘The Human Condition of Politics: considering the Legacy of Hans J. Morgenthau for 
International Relations’, Journal of International Political Theory, 9:1-2 (2013). 
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the re-interpretation of history, and the standardisation of an official language.39 Generally, 
the rise of ideologies concerned Morgenthau because they restricted human drives and 
stripped people of their true capabilities. Elaborating on these consequences, Morgenthau 
further argued that ideologies leave people in mediocrity because their abilities are 
restrained into a bureaucratised order which supports the ideology and hinders free and 
reflective thinking.40 
For Morgenthau, in an ideologised environment, the drive to prove oneself had to exhaust 
itself in the form of the animus dominandi; dehumanisation inhibits the ability for people to 
realise their potential and actively hinders them from contributing to the creation of their 
life-worlds. Morgenthau’s terminology reveals that this empirical concept of power rested 
on Weber’s well-known definition of power. Weber defined power as ‘the probability that 
one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite 
resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests.’41 Indeed, Morgenthau 
provided a similar definition in Politics Among Nations. He remarked that ‘[p]olitical power 
is a psychological relation between those who exercise it and those over whom it is 
exercised. It gives the former control over certain actions of the latter through the impact 
which the former exerts on the latter’s minds.’42 However, reducing power to a lust for 
domination meant that interpersonal relationships were conflict-driven, and the potential 
for aggression was constantly looming. To hinder the outbreak of violence domestically, 
                                                          
39 Jack Snyder, ‘Tensions with Realism: 1945 and after’, in Nicolas Guilhot (ed), The Invention of International 
Relations Theory. Realism, the Rockefeller Foundation and the 1954 Conference on Theory (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2011), p. 58. 
40 Hans J. Morgenthau, ‘The Social Crisis in America: Hedonism of Status Quo’, Chicago Review, 14:2 (1960). 
Equally: ‘Letter to Bryon Dobell’, 9th July 1968 (Container 43, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, 
Washington, DC). 
41 Max Weber, Economy and Society. An Outline of Interpretative Sociology. Volume I (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1978), p. 53. 
42 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1985), p. 32. 
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nation-states had to assertively erect moral, societal, and/or legal restraints, which 
Morgenthau examined in his post-doctoral thesis La Réalité des Normes.43 Without such 
restraints, the existence of nation-states could be threatened.  
Yet, on the international level, there would be at best moral restrictions to hinder people 
from seeking to fulfil their lust for domination. But these restrictions were also eliminated 
through the ruthless employment of ‘cultural blinders’44 by nation-states, which encouraged 
people to pursue their lust for domination on the international level. By identifying with the 
nation-state, especially during times of crisis, people could satisfy their lust by receiving a 
share of the power a nation-state acquires on the international scene.45 For Morgenthau, 
one of these cultural blinders was the fetishisation of masculinity, as he argued that this was 
one of the causes for the outbreak of World War I.46 World War II and the Shoah were 
additional personal experiences for Morgenthau which demonstrated the devastation this 
lust can create. 
Morgenthau also borrowed the consequences of this conceptualisation of power for the 
international level from Weber. In Politics as a Vocation, which, according to Robbie Shilliam, 
Morgenthau read enthusiastically,47 Weber noted that ‘[w]hen we say that a question is 
“political” ... we always mean the same thing. This is that the interests involved in the 
distribution or preservation of power, or a shift in power, play a decisive role in resolving 
                                                          
43 Hans J. Morgenthau, La Réalité des Normes. En particulier des Normes du Droit International. Fondement 
d’une Théorie des Normes (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1934). This point is also raised in: Seán Molloy, ‘Realism: a 
Problematic Paradigm’, Security Dialogue, 34:1 (2003), p. 83. 
44 Hans J. Morgenthau, Political Theory and International Affairs. Hans J. Morgenthau on Aristotle’s The Politics. 
Edited by Anthony F. Lang Jr. (Westport: Praeger, 2004), p. 36.  
45 Schuett, ‘Freudian Roots of Political Realism’, pp. 61-6 and William E. Scheuerman, Hans Morgenthau. 
Realism and Beyond (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), pp. 37-8. A critical discussion of this point is provided in: 
William E. Scheuerman, The Realist Case for Global Reform (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011), pp. 49-53. 
46 Morgenthau, ‘Der Selbstmord mit gutem Gewissen’. 
47 Robbie Shilliam, ‘Morgenthau in Context: German Backwardness, German Intellectuals and the Rise and Fall 
of a Liberal Project’, European Journal of International Relations, 13:3 (2007), p. 312. 
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that question.’48 Morgenthau’s biographer Frei ascertained that he already referred to these 
strategies in a footnote in his doctoral thesis, but only in La Notion du Politique did he 
become explicit. 49 Power ‘can aim to maintain acquired power, to increase it, or to manifest 
it.’50 Another 15 years later, in his seminal Politics Among Nations, Morgenthau equally 
noted that ‘[a]ll politics ... reveals three basic patterns ... either to keep power, to increase 
power, or to demonstrate power.’51 Indeed, Morgenthau devoted a good deal of Politics 
Among Nations to the meticulous analysis of these different forms of empirical power. This 
intellectual congruence of Morgenthau and Weber, in their understanding of empirical 
power, led numerous scholars to comment on Morgenthau as an apologist of power 
politics.52  
However, Politics Among Nations cannot be read as a theory of international politics 
because Morgenthau argued that a theory, which aims ‘… to reduce international relations 
to a system of abstract propositions with a predictive function,’53 is ahistoric. For this reason, 
theories, which neglect the specific contingencies that had led to political events neither 
improve the theoretical understanding of international politics nor are they useful as 
guidelines for political action. Morgenthau did not rule out the possibility of developing a 
theory of international politics, but its scope would be limited because no theory could 
consider all the potential historical contingencies.54 Politics Among Nations also does not 
lend itself as evidence for the foundation of a Morgenthauian Realpolitik, but recent 
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scholarship argues that Politics Among Nations has to be viewed as ‘historically and 
politically contingent’55, in other words spatially and temporally conditioned. Indeed, a 
closer examination demonstrates Morgenthau’s intention to write a counter-ideology to 
nationalism and fascism, rather than a theory as he acknowledged in the preface.56 
Correspondingly, the concept of power, as Morgenthau understood and presented it in 
Politics Among Nations, was the empirically dominant version in an ideologised world; 
normatively speaking, however, he fundamentally opposed an understanding of power that 
was reduced to an unhindered lust for domination. In an academically much referred letter 
to Michael Oakeshott57, written shortly after the first issue of Politics Among Nations was 
published, Morgenthau argued that ideologisation had reduced the creative abilities of 
humans and left them intellectually unaware of their actual capabilities to create their life-
worlds, which is why ‘[m]an is tragic because he cannot do what he ought to do.’58 This 
explains why Morgenthau was initially reluctant to re-issue Politics Among Nations as 
evidenced in his month-long correspondence with his editor Robert Shugg at Alfred Knopf. 
However, the rise of the Cold War eventually convinced Morgenthau that the age of 
ideologies was far from over and Politics Among Nations had yet to serve its needs as he 
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repeated the assessment he had given to Oakeshott in a different letter almost 15 years 
later.59   
 
Puissance: Morgenthau’s Normative Concept of Power  
Normatively, Morgenthau aspired for a different kind of power. He reasoned that ‘[t]o say 
that a political action has no moral purpose is absurd’ because ‘political action can be 
defined as an attempt to realize moral values through the medium of politics, that is, 
power.’60 Puissance, the form of power he argued would be the defining factor in politics, is, 
therefore, not characterised by domination. Rather, people are empowered to act together, 
through the alignment of their antagonism of interests, in order to create their life-world 
through self-determination. 61 Therefore, although Ty Solomon is right to argue that 
Morgenthau’s concept of power is more than the animus dominandi side of the drive for 
self-preservation, he is mistaken to believe that ‘power can only construct a façade of 
union.’62 In short, whereas pouvoir is ultimately a negative concept, with puissance 
Morgenthau achieved a positive concept of power. 63 
 
Amor Fati and Amor Mundi 
Morgenthau found intellectual stimulation in Nietzsche for his positive concept of power, 
which is an expression of Morgenthau’s deep-rooted humanism, or what Hannah Arendt 
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would have called amor mundi64. In order to love the world, people had at first to embrace 
their destiny, Nietzsche’s amor fati65. For Nietzsche, this embracement is the initial 
recognition of the eternal recurrence – a concept that contradicted any teleological life-
stories, and is epitomised in Nietzsche’s nihilistic concept of time and space. In Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra, Nietzsche noted that ‘[e]verything goes, everything returns; the wheel of 
existence rolls forever. Everything dies, everything blossoms anew; the year of existence 
runs on forever … Everything departs, everything meets again; the ring of existence is true 
to itself forever.’66 Morgenthau was convinced that if people understood this initial 
aimlessness and meaninglessness, they would understand that modern societies’ 
ideologisation had deprived them of their ability to construct their own life-worlds and that 
they would consequently develop and use their actual abilities.  
Nonetheless, Morgenthau was also aware that this nihilism of life can be, at least in the 
beginning, disappointing to humans, since it ‘offers with each answer new questions, with 
each victory a new disappointment, and thus seems to lead nowhere. In this labyrinth of 
unconnected causal connections man discovers many little answers but no answer to the 
great questions of his life, no meaning, no direction.’67 Countless combinations of actions 
and reactions provide a myriad of eternally recurrent moments, which evolve without pre-
prescribed purpose or aim. However, Nietzsche’s concept does not imply surrendering to 
the nihilism of life, but overcoming it. In a later work, Nietzsche accentuated that ‘[t]he 
unalterable sequence of certain phenomena demonstrates no “law” but a power 
                                                          
64 Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, Hannah Arendt. For Love of the World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), p. 
324. 
65 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science. With a Prelude in German Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 157. 
66 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra. A Book for Everyone and No One (London: Penguin, 1969), p. 
234. 
67 Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, p. 176. 
17 
 
relationship between two or more forces.’68 People do not have to agonise about these 
returning moments, but they can choose to affirm and endorse them. This is the amor fati, 
the embracing of one’s destiny. Endorsing such recurrences means relating the initially 
meaningless moments to oneself and, thereby, by altering them ever so slightly, transform 
them into significant situations. Such a positive attribution enables people to overcome 
their surrounding nihilism, since, as the literary theorist Lee Spinks mentions, they recognise 
that ‘life is an eternal movement of becoming.’69  
However, accepting the amor fati not only is disappointing at the beginning, but it also 
denotes a dolorous affair, because it causes, in György Lukács’s words, ‘transcendental 
homelessness.’70 As such, people yearn for the transcendental shelter of ontological 
security 71  which ideologies provide with a carefree, clearly structured life through 
standardised conceptions of reason, virtue, justice, and even pity and happiness. But people 
pay a high price for this ontological security as their subjectivity is being negated. Only when 
they accept their fate they can become an Übermensch. Lately, Neacsu reasoned that this 
Nietzschean concept provided Morgenthau with the ideal for what is required to arrive at a 
positive connotation of power. 72  The recognition of the eternal recurrence, and 
concurrently the renunciation of an ideologised life through encyclopaedic knowledge, and 
the ability to intellectually alienate oneself from one’s life-world enable an understanding of 
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knowledge-power relations, how they are temporally and spatially conditioned, and 
consider their influence on society. 
The Übermensch epitomises the ability to recognise and the will to overcome the 
surrounding nihilistic world. Through self-restraint, self-assurance, and self-reflection, one is 
able to refer the ever-recurrent moments to oneself. Morgenthau argued, in congruence 
with Nietzsche, that this would create meaning and eventually identity. Therefore, 
Morgenthau viewed puissance as the ability to create an identity that is not achieved 
through distinction from otherness, but in togetherness through one’s own will. It is for this 
reason that Morgenthau deplored the absence of the qualities of an Übermensch in Science: 
Servant or Master?: 
‘[t]his meaningless and aimless activity may convey the superficial appearance of an 
abundant dynamism trying to transform the empirical world. In truth, however, it is 
not the pressure of creative force but flight from his true task that drives man 
beyond himself through action. In the intoxication of incessant activity, man tries to 
forget the question posed by the metaphysical shock. Yet, since the noise of the 
active world can drown out that question but cannot altogether silence it, complete 
oblivion, which is coincident with the end of consciousness itself, becomes the 
unacknowledged ultimate aim.’73  
Achieving the stage of an Übermensch, through the ability to create one’s own identity, is 
total liberation since ‘[w]illing liberates: that is the true doctrine of will and freedom.’74 It 
liberates people from the reactionary forces of ideologies that control the constructions of 
life-worlds, through enforcing ostensibly eternal dichotomies, in order to affirm the status 
quo because such dichotomies do not have universal meaning; rather, they are created to 
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legitimise cultural habits and policies. 75  Morgenthau’s refusal of such simplifying 
dichotomies is stipulated in a letter from 1968 in which he located the reason for the 
student protests of the 1960s within this ideologisation because it obstructed people to 
participate in the political arena.76 Morgenthau saw politics as a social realm, in which 
people would (and should) not have to succumb to structural obligations manifested in 
dichotomies of good and bad, right and wrong, or friend and enemy, for which Morgenthau 
had criticised Carl Schmitt.77 Rather, puissance enabled people to follow their interests and 
participate in the creation of their own life-world. 
This liberation through meaning-attribution is epitomised in an at first glance peculiar, yet in 
its peculiarity very forceful example: death. Questions of death concerned Morgenthau 
throughout his career. References are to be found in his earliest unpublished manuscripts, 
such as Suicide with a Good Conscience, and in his last academic contributions, such as 
Science: Servant or Master?. In the latter study, Morgenthau claimed that even death is a 
form of liberation. Certainly, death ‘is the very negation of all men experiences as 
specifically human in his existence: the consciousness of himself and of his world, the 
remembrance of things past and the ambitions of things to come, a creativeness in thought 
and action that aspires to … the eternal.’78 Still, Morgenthau argued that, even for humans 
who disapproved of religious discourses of eternity or ideological promises of immortality, 
death would signify no end of liberation. In their efforts to actively give meaning to life, they 
leave pieces of reminiscence behind through which people have an influence on their life-
worlds even after their death. Furthermore, even death itself can become a liberating 
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experience since – by committing suicide with a good conscience – people master their 
biological death by choosing the place, time, and even the tenor of their own death.79  
To summarise so far, on his way to establish a positive connotation of power, Morgenthau 
relied primarily on his ‘Jugendliebe’ (adolescent love): Nietzsche.80 It was the study of 
Nietzsche’s work that enabled Morgenthau to conceptualise power as the ability and will to 
discern. To understand the nihilism and to overcome it by attaching value to initially 
insignificant moments – hence, by alluding one’s surrounding world to oneself – the will to 
power finds its expression. Nietzsche remarked that ‘[m]an first implanted values into things 
to maintain himself – he created the meaning of things, a human meaning … Only through 
evaluation is there value: and without evaluation the nut of existence would be hollow.’81 
Morgenthau used this ‘psychological factor … the will to power’82 by arguing that, as a homo 
faber, one embeds ‘his biological existence within technological and social artefacts that 
survive that existence. His imagination creates new worlds of religion, art, and reason that 
live after their creator.’83 
 
Power as the Ability to Act 
As Morgenthau’s diction in Science: Servant or Master? indicates, for the final step in 
elaborating puissance Morgenthau is concordant with Arendt. In his manuscript on 
metaphysics, he moved on from Nietzsche because he had realised that Nietzsche’s will to 
power only accentuated the individual, but ignored social relations and, more importantly, 
did not provide answers for what kind of society these relations constructed. Like the 
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sociologist Georg Simmel, with whose work Morgenthau was well acquainted, 84  
Morgenthau did not endorse Nietzsche’s view of a pre-existing reality which considered the 
will to power and its achievement as the highest ethical value in itself. Rather, the will to 
power has to be implemented for the achievement of the common good, since ‘there is 
nothing more senseless for the human conscience than a morale which is indifferent to the 
dissolution of human society.’85 
Contrastingly, the ‘thinking partnership’86 with Arendt enabled Morgenthau to consider the 
effects of power for a society at large. Despite the importance of this thinking partnership 
for Morgenthau’s concept of power (and indeed to his entire world-view), it still awaits a 
more comprehensive elaboration. Christoph Rohde rightfully contends in his monograph on 
Morgenthau that his concept of power was influenced by Arendt, but only comes to this 
conclusion after giving a lengthy analysis of Morgenthau’s intellectual indebtedness to 
Nietzsche and Weber.87 Patricia Owens also recently earned merits for elaborating Arendt’s 
ethic of reality and for making her accessible to current realist scholarship, but her focus on 
Arendt did not allow her to further elaborate this intellectual relationship.88 The most 
thorough elaboration on Arendt and Morgenthau to date was provided by Douglas 
Klusmeyer. In his discussion of Arendt’s, Morgenthau’s, and George Kennan’s stance on the 
Shoah, he showed that, despite their similar life-trajectories (in the case of Arendt and 
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Morgenthau), the Shoah became only central to Arendt’s political thought.89 However, 
Klusmeyer also tells the reader little about their strong conceptual congruence.  
In order to elaborate their similar conceptualisation of normative power, we have to turn to 
Arendt’s study On Violence from 1970.90 As the late publication date of Arendt’s study 
would indicate, this is not to argue that Arendt copied Morgenthau’s concept or vice versa, 
but the term “thinking partnership” signifies that both were intellectually rooted in 
Continental European humanities. This intellectual background, in combination with their 
academic and personal exchanges, fostered similar understandings of power.  
For Arendt, ‘[p]ower corresponds to the human ability not just to act but act in concert. 
Power is never the property of an individual; it belongs to a group and remains in existence 
only so long as the group keeps together.’91 Power signifies the consent of people to 
temporarily come together in collective speech and action, in order to create institutions, 
laws, and norms.92 For Arendt and Morgenthau, power was not a means, but was an end in 
itself, which explains that both scholars distinguished between power and violence.93 This 
distinction is epitomised in Morgenthau’s stance towards the aforementioned student 
protests. He argued that violent outbreaks were a consequence of the disempowerment of 
students. In other words, they protested against their inability to contribute to the creation 
of their life-worlds, an inability caused by the ideological affirmation of the status quo.94 
Correspondingly, as recent scholarship has argued, violence is a potential consequence 
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when puissance is absent and it is a characteristic of pouvoir. Power is only legitimised 
through collective action as Morgenthau, like Arendt, clearly distinguished in Politics Among 
Nations between legitimate power (puissance) and illegitimate power (pouvoir).95  
For Morgenthau, power was an end since only through its achievement is it possible to 
create a good life for humans in a society.96 The good life, which is directed to acquire a 
common good (bonum commune), ‘is a life that is led by justice, which is also indicated by 
the general conception of politics ... that the philosophy of politics is really a subdivision of 
ethics.’97 Admittedly, this definition is murky. In a letter from 22nd August 1958, Morgenthau 
was more explicit about the meaning of a good life, yet it is still a basic and broad definition. 
It was now defined as ‘the preservation of life and freedom in the sense of the Judeo-
Christian tradition and … of Kantian philosophy.’98 About 20 years later, Morgenthau largely 
repeated this definition in one of his last public lectures. 99  Certainly, criticism of 
Morgenthau for not further investigating this kind of sociation is legitimate. Nevertheless, 
the absence of a clearer definition of the good life in Morgenthau’s work demonstrates that 
it was, like so many of his concepts, flexible, in which particular content was based on the 
compromise of the involved peoples’ interests.100 Morgenthau argued, by referring to Karl 
Mannheim’s Standortgebundenheit 101 , that, because of the temporal and spatial 
conditionality of knowledge, concepts do not have a pre-inscribed absolute meaning and/or 
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scope. As a result, Morgenthau cannot be seen as having an a priori concept of the good life, 
but acknowledged that people may have different understandings of it. Merely, the integrity 
of human life and dignity were considered by Morgenthau as its basic elements upon which 
a ‘sphere of elasticity’102 has to be established. For Morgenthau, this public sphere enables 
the development of a common good. The antagonism of interests could take place freely 
and peacefully in this sphere because it allows people aligning these interests. In this 
context, the task of political leaders is to have a broad telos in mind, since they have to 
support this alignment by considering all these interests while leading communities towards 
the achievement of the common good. Morgenthau noted in one of his lectures on 
Aristotle: ‘[t]he virtue of a good ruler is identical with a good man. Because the good ruler, 
having to preside over a human society of which all human beings are members, must 
promote … the telos of man as such.’103  
From this follows that power was for Morgenthau, like Arendt, a collective affair that 
enables people to constantly construct their life-worlds by forming societies as temporal 
manifestations of the common good. People achieve these manifestations through the 
alignment of their antagonism of interests. It is people’s wilful construction of the life-world 
that makes Morgenthau’s concept of power an expression of his amor mundi.  
 
Conclusion 
From this discussion of Morgenthau’s dualistic concept of power, we can draw two 
conclusions which are of significance for International Relations. 
First, it has implications for the sociology of the knowledge of the discipline. It was 
demonstrated that Morgenthau did not measure power in terms of material or 
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technological capacity as it was common among his American academic coevals.104 He also 
did not follow exclusively Weber or Freud by promoting a concept of power that fostered 
socio-political domination, although he analytically dealt with this animus dominandi as 
evidenced most famously in Politics Among Nations. Rather, by building upon Nietzsche and 
in agreement with Arendt, power was for Morgenthau a temporally and spatially 
conditioned collective affair whose intention it is to transcend the natural limitations of 
humans if they act on their own. Therefore, this article is a contribution to discerning the 
complexity of Morgenthau’s concept of power – in terms of its intellectual fundament, 
epistemological framework, and normative outlook – whose misunderstanding originates 
from the difficulties (sometimes even impossibility) to translate words in their entire 
cultural, historical, and philosophical meaning. Hartmut Behr and William Bain have 
convincingly elaborated that without the necessary language skills and knowledge about the 
Continental European history of thought an analysis of Morgenthau ends in distortion.105  
To avoid such misinterpretations, an intellectual engagement with Morgenthau requires a 
contextualisation into the academic culture and intellectual tradition in which his thought 
evolved. Focusing on the intellectual relationship to one scholar offers the advantage to be 
able to analyse this specific relationship comprehensively. However, it bears the risk of 
overemphasising its role for the development of Morgenthau’s political thought, and, what 
is more, it cannot trace this development because his spatial and temporal conditionality of 
knowledge is reduced to one relation. In the case of previous elaborations of Morgenthau, 
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scholarship rightfully stressed that there is an intellectual congruence to Weber and Freud, 
but Morgenthau’s fundamental opposition to power as pouvoir was left unnoticed. Hence, 
only when we put the concept – in this case power – in the focus of a careful 
contextualisation is it possible to gain a wider perspective of its meaning and usage, which 
in turns allows us to ask ourselves if, and how, it is of relevance for International Relations in 
the twenty-first century.  
This leads to the second conclusion to be drawn from the discussion of Morgenthau’s 
concept of power. Envisioning power as puissance, Morgenthau, like many other European 
émigré scholars, stands in the tradition of stressing the human factor of politics.106 Of 
course, this refers to Arendt’s The Human Condition, but Herbert Marcuse, Eric Voegelin, 
Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, and Waldemar Gurian107 were also critical of the rising 
influence of rationalism, empiricism, and idealism in Western democracies and 
consequently turned against any effort to socially plan the world through measuring and 
controlling human behaviour. Puissance, therefore, helps to face post-democratic 
tendencies in Western societies.  
Post-democracies are characterised by Colin Crouch as states with governments which 
removed the political from more and more aspects of social life, succumbing them to 
rationalisation measures. This depoliticisation rests on the assumption that the common 
good is an objective quantity and the antagonism of interests is not to be carried out in 
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of his life and work: Ellen Thümmler, Katholischer Publizist und amerikanischer Politikwissenschaftler. Eine 
intellektuelle Biografie Waldemar Gurians (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2011). 
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democratic processes, but resolved through administrative acts. 108 Chantal Mouffe also 
argues in this vein by criticising the presumption that conflicts can be resolved through 
finding a consensus. For Mouffe, following Schmitt, this is presumptuous because ‘[t]he 
political cannot be grasped by … rationalism for the simple reason that every consistent 
rationalism requires negating the irreducibility of antagonism.’ This is the case because ‘… 
what antagonism reveals is the very limit of any rational consensus [by bringing to the fore 
the inescapable moment of decision].’109 Rather, democracies have to ensure that the 
potentially violent antagonisms are reduced to an “agonism” in which there still exists a 
dichotomy of otherness, but the conflicting parties accept at least each other’s legitimacy.  
However, according to a recent study by Frank-Olaf Radtke, the depoliticisation does not 
only hinder the establishment of agonistic conflicts, but even creates antagonism. In the 
aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, White Papers were issued and programs were set up 
under the catchphrase of a “dialogue of cultures”.110 The purpose of these dialogues was to 
establish a cultural consensus within a national context. However, despite good intentions, 
these institutionalised dialogues failed to establish consensus because they were not 
conceived as an open process with equal rights. Rather, they were set up with the intention 
to affirm the status quo, in which the immigrating minority has to adopt the regulations of 
the majority. What is more, these dialogues reduced culture to ethnic-religious otherness 
and thereby created an irrevocable we-they dichotomy that had not existed before.111  
                                                          
108 Colin Crouch, Post-Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), chapter 1 and The Strange Non-Death of 
Neoliberalism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011), chapter 7. 
109 Chantal Mouffe, On the Political (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 12. 
110 Examples are: Council of Europe, White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue. “Living Together as Equals in 
Dignity” (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2008) and European Commission, Highlights of the European Year of 
Intercultural Dialogue 2008 (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2009). 
111  Frank-Olaf Radtke, Kulturen sprechen nicht. Die Politik grenzüberschreitender Dialoge (Hamburg: 
Hamburger Edition, 2011), pp. 12-25. 
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A Morgenthauian inspired scholarship critically reflects on this depoliticisation in Western 
democracies by analytically exploring the empirical concept of power (pouvoir) and equally 
asks for a normative invigoration of the political realm. Puissance aims to re-establish the 
political so that people can interact in debates, experience the antagonism of interests, and 
discuss ways to ensure a common good. These debates, or “discussion[s]” 112 , as 
Morgenthau called them, can re-empower people because they allow them to wilfully 
create their life-world together. Puissance goes therefore beyond contemporary discussions 
of depoliticisation. Morgenthau did not conceive the antagonism of interests as a Schmittian 
inspired dichotomy of friend and enemy, but acknowledges each interest in its own right 
and positively embraces the creative potential of these antagonisms.  
 
                                                          
112 Morgenthau, The Concept of the Political, p. 126. 
